By Chris Thatcher | September 19, 2016 Estimated reading time 4 minutes, 14 seconds.
As the federal government transitions from a summer of “sunny ways” to a fall of policy days, one of the many items on its agenda will be the Royal Canadian Air Force’s fighter jet replacement program.
Among the government’s key decisions will be whether to extend the life of the current fleet of CF-188 Hornets through to 2025, and whether to introduce an interim capability—an idea it floated in June—or proceed with an open competition.
The Liberals campaigned on a pledge to “immediately launch” a competition to replace the Hornets. But the party also stated their government would not buy the Lockheed Martin F-35A Joint Strike Fighter, the highly advanced aircraft selected by the previous Conservative government to fulfill the RCAF’s domestic and expeditionary operations out through the 2060s.
In June, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau re-emphasized his case for not acquiring the F-35A, stating the fighter jet “is far from working,” though both the United States Air Force and U.S. Marine Corps have declared their variants of the aircraft ready for combat.
While the F-35 program has no shortage of critics, most of the issues they have flagged have been addressed. And partner nations such as Denmark and foreign military sales customers such as Japan have in recent months confirmed their intention to make the jets a central piece of their future combat force.
Yet ever since the Conservative government’s badly managed announcement in July 2010 that the F-35 would replace the CF-188, the program has faced a barrage of criticism that has contributed to widespread public and government misunderstanding about the F-35’s value to Canada, Richard Shimooka contends.
In a recent paper titled, “The Fourth Dimension: The F-35 Program, Defence Procurement, and the Conservative Government,” the Research Fellow with the Conference of Defence Associations Institute argues that criticism of the aircraft’s capabilities and overall financial costs are inaccurate.
Instead, he paints a picture of a “proper evaluation” process by a Next Generation Fighter Capability Office that was derailed in part by the timing of unfortunate events, poor and centralized communication, and political interference.
The paper is based on interviews with more than 30 people directly involved in the program and tells a behind-the-scenes story that has not been described in most media accounts. Among other things, Shimooka refutes the findings of two key reports in 2011 and 2012 by the Parliamentary Budget Officer and the Office of the Auditor General that undermined the credibility of the project office’s costings for F-35 acquisition and operational life sustainment. Both reports received extensive media coverage.
Later studies would support the project office’s original cost figures, but by then the damage had been done. And a combination of leaked briefing notes in the U.S., an aircraft engine fire, and other events stalled the government’s plan to move forward with a sole-source contract on the F-35 until after the 2015 election.
Despite the many problems with the CF-188 replacement project, Shimooka notes that “few, if any, of the program’s fundamentals have changed. Many of the considerations that underpinned the original analysis are still valid.”
And he advises the current Liberal government “to take heed of what occurred before” as it considers its next move.
The full paper is available at: www.cdainstitute.ca/images/Vimy_Papers/Vimy_Paper_33.pdf
