What do Canada’s CF-188 Hornets have in common with the United States’ F-15 Eagles, F-16 Fighting Falcons and F-22 Raptors? Other than the fact that they are fighter aircraft, the only true commonality is their tasking by the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) to respond to foreign bogeys that come too close to our continental airspace.

The intruders have been mostly Russian Tupolev Tu-95 “Bear” long-range turboprop bombers, occasionally with a fighter escort, which entered service in 1958 and are expected to continue flying until at least 2040. While approaches tapered off sharply with the end of the Cold War, recent years have seen a resurgence, albeit not to previous levels.

Even so, Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) crews and their U.S. counterparts remain continuously ready to scramble within minutes after Russian or, indeed, any other potentially problematic military or civilian aircraft are detected by a global network of space-, air- or ground-based sensors. It’s a big job, considering that more than 200,000 flights a year are tracked.

All traffic entering a NORAD air defence identification zone (ADIZ), which extend up to 320 kilometres offshore, must radio their planned course, destination and other details about their transit of the continental envelope to air traffic controllers at Nav Canada or their Federal Aviation Administration counterparts. Transponders also facilitate tracking; any aircraft not squawking data warrants a combat-ready interception.

Canada’s NORAD mission within this globally unique military partnership is headquartered at 1 Canadian Air Division (1 CAD) in Winnipeg, Man. However, a facility at CFB North Bay, Ont., is the operational heart, where RCAF 22 Wing monitors and identifies all aircraft entering Canadian airspace.

22 Wing, which has no aircraft of its own, also plays a key role in protecting important visitors such as U.S. President Donald Trump on Air Force One, who flew to the G7 Summit in Quebec in June.

The U.S. has two ADIZ, encompassing Alaska’s coastal regions and the southern continental states, except along the Canadian and Mexican borders. The former is controlled from Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson just outside Anchorage, home to U.S. Air Force and Air National Guard squadrons. The latter, coordinated by Tyndall AFB in Florida, includes the Western Defense Sector, headquartered at McChord AFB near Tacoma, Wash., and the Eastern Defense Sector, headquartered at Rome, N.Y.–each a short hop from the Canadian border.

The location that understandably comes most to mind when NORAD is mentioned, thanks to countless portrayals in apocalyptic films and TV shows, is the Cheyenne Mountain Complex near Colorado Springs, Colo., with its massive facilities deep underground in solid granite designed to survive a nuclear strike. The main centre, since NORAD’s role was broadened in 2006, is at nearby Peterson AFB, also home to the U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), the primary defender against any mainland invasion.

RETURN OF THE BEAR

NORAD as an entity was born in 1957 ,when the two federal governments unveiled plans for a joint response to attack by Russian nuclear bombers. The politically-contentious initiative was formalized the following May and, despite occasional controversy, has been a technical success that has been continually refined to address new threats such as cruise missiles.

When a threat is brought to the attention of the NORAD command, it provides an integrated tactical warning and attack assessment to both governments. Its mission also includes detection and monitoring of narcotics traffickers’ aircraft, with information passed on for action by civilian law enforcement agencies such as the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and, in the U.S., the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Drug Enforcement Agency.

The latest but ostensibly sporadic uptick in Russian activity began in April 2017, when two CF-188s were scrambled by NORAD as two Tu-95s approached U.S. and Canadian airspace in the western Arctic. The Canadian aircraft, whose crews practice interceptions regularly, were joined by two F-22s. It was the first such reported activity since 2015, when the Russians grounded their aircraft for safety reasons.

A NORAD official stressed that the Tu-95s “professionally and safely” did not enter either country’s airspace. But it also was the fourth time in as many days that the big bombers, along with Ilyushin IL-38 maritime patrol aircraft, had been detected.

“It’s not unprecedented,” said a NORAD official, attributing the increased frequency to a need to refresh and train aircrews after being grounded for so long. The official said the intercepts had shown “the value of NORAD and [the] binational U.S. and Canada relationship.”

The following month, two F-22s closed on another pair of Tu-95s–this time with formidable Sukhoi Su-25 “Frogfoot” fighter escorts, the first such formation since 2015–as they flew to within 80 kilometres of the state’s northwestern tip. A loitering Beriev A-50 “Mainstay” airborne early warning and control aircraft remained in international airspace.

The most recent reported interception occurred in May 2018 when yet another Tu-95 duo, again off western Alaska, were met by F-22s shortly after entering the ADIZ north of the Aleutian Islands, which reaches almost to the Russian mainland on the other side of the Bering Strait. However, they left a short while later without actually entering U.S. airspace, having apparently completed what is once more becoming a regular training exercise.

While the main NORAD focus is military, civil traffic also comes under its wing. There was a high-profile interception of a Montreal-based Sunwing daily charter flight to Cuba in July 2017 after the crew reported a situation which had begun with “an unruly customer making nonspecific threats.” The Boeing 737-800 with 170 passengers was met in U.S. airspace by two F-15s, scrambled out of Massachusetts, while two CF-188s from Bagotville, Que., and two F-16s out of New Jersey monitored the situation at a distance.

(The passenger, who evidently had been threatening other passengers and cabin crew, was arrested and charged with multiple offences, including assault and posing a threat to aviation security. He eventually was sentenced in April 2018 to time served in custody, put on probation for three years, and ordered to compensate Sunwing for more than $17,000 in costs.)

It was a minor incident in the overall picture of NORAD air traffic, but it could have been more serious and was a valuable exercise for the Canadian and U.S. fighter crews, who train regularly and usually unnoticed.

COMPLEXITY IS YOUR COMPANION

NORAD is under the command of USAF Gen Terrence O’Shaughnessy and his deputy commander, RCAF LGen Christopher Coates.

O’Shaughessy succeeded NORAD’s first female commander, Gen Lori Robinson, at a ceremony in May 2018, presided over by U.S. Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis and Canadian Chief of the Defence Staff Gen Jonathan Vance and attended by, among others, Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan and the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen Joseph Dunford.

Mattis said threats today are sophisticated and less predictable than those NORAD faced in the early years. “As your team deters adversaries and defends us from these threats in the days to come, complexity will be your constant companion,” he told O’Shaughnessy. “You must embrace it and master it.”

O’Shaughnessy acknowledged the responsibility and said, “I am joining a combined team that has safeguarded our nations amidst one of the most diverse and challenging security atmospheres in our history.”

Sajjan agreed. “Threats to North America have changed and we need to change along with it,” he said. “To be effective in the 21st century we have to continue to work together to modernize NORAD in support of our strategic commands. As part of Canada’s new defence policy … we are committed to our working partnership. For decades to come, we will continue to collaborate in innovative ways to keep North America safe.”

All were essentially echoing a statement by Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and President Trump after their first official meeting, in Washington, in February 2017.

“NORAD … illustrates the strength of our mutual commitment,” they said. “United States and Canadian forces jointly conduct aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning in defence of North America. We will work to modernize and broaden our NORAD partnership in these key domains, as well as in cyber and space.”

Even though Russia is still seen as the key potential aggressor, given its recent activities in Eastern Europe and Syria, how NORAD will evolve to meet its historic adversary’s new strategic doctrine is uncertain. There also is the prospect of attack by “non-state” entities such as terrorist groups.

“The ‘new’ threat or strategic environment is the primary driver behind both modernization and evolution,” wrote Andrea Charron and James Fergusson, two of Canada’s leading experts on NORAD, in a policy paper released by the Centre for Defence and Security Studies (CDSS) at the University of Manitoba in May 2017. “There are major gaps related to NORAD’s aerospace and maritime warning missions, and its air defence control mission. Essentially, the requirements to fill these gaps dictate a response beyond simply modernizing the NWS (North Warning System) and replacing aged radars, jets and ships.”

Charron, director of the CDSS and a member of the Department of National Defence’s advisory board, and Fergusson, CDSS deputy director, argued that, related to new threats, “is the need for evolved command and control arrangements as well as potentially expanded delegations of authorities, and the potential acquisition of new missions, especially maritime control, to NORAD. In effect, the NORAD of tomorrow may be appreciably different from NORAD today, which also means that the defence of North America will be different, assuming, of course, both governments agree to taking the necessary steps forward.”

The university hosted a conference in May, attended by current and past senior leaders of NORAD, to mark the 60th anniversary and debate many of the proposed changes.

THE NEXT 60 YEARS

When the government unveiled its new defence policy, Strong, Secure, Engaged, in June 2017, it committed to significant spending increases in all commands over the next decade, including NORAD.

“We are active players in a modern, continental defence partnership,” said Sajjan at the time. “We will enter discussions with our U.S. counterparts on NORAD modernization. That will include replacing the North Warning System with new technology. And it will include an all-perils approach to protecting against the full range of threats including air, maritime and underwater.”

Charron pointed out in an analysis for the Conference of Defence Associations Institute that that there was really nothing new about NORAD or the Arctic in the government’s plan. She reiterated her concerns about new threats such as cruise missiles and “drones,” which she said the NWS is not designed to detect. “Furthermore, the NWS is located deep into Canadian territory, which means it cannot give the type of advanced warning it was once designed to provide given the new threats Canada faces.”

The earlier paper with Fergusson had suggested that the evolving environment could influence the government’s choice of new fighters to replace its upgraded but aging fleet of CF-188s. Charron returned to that in her analysis. “Ensuring Canada can meet its NORAD commitments is one of the impetuses for the replacement,” she said, pointing out that through its annual fall exercise, Vigilant Shield, NORAD had been testing different command and control arrangements, including a dedicated in-theatre commander responding to the NORAD commander so that there would be only one “button” to push for all tasking of NORAD-assigned Canadian and U.S. aircraft.

“Canada needs to think through the ramification of this potential change for its forces and operations before moving ahead with any changes,” she warned, clearly signalling that Canada and NORAD face potentially more daunting bogeys than Russian bombers.